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SINGAPORE’S REGIONALIZATION BLUEPRINT: 
THE EMPIRICS OF THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Strategic  management  for  economic  development  has  been  the  hallmark  of  the  Singapore  ‘success 
story’.  State-led, market-driven intervention has underscored the city-state’s development strategies. This 
paper  revisits  this  development  blueprint  in  the  context  of  Singapore’s  efforts  at  regionalization.  The 
paper takes a closer look at Singapore’s regionalization imperative, and the ‘portability’ of the strategy – 
in the framework of Regionalization 21 – beyond the city-state. Evidence from Singapore’s industrial-
township  projects  in  Indonesia,  Vietnam  and  India  are  presented.  We  conclude  that  the  calculated, 
schematized efforts, though remarkable, have been overly optimistic and have failed to engender equally 
compelling results, more often than not frustrated by the intricacies of socio-political realities in the host 
economies.          
 
Key words: Regionalization - Industrial Parks - Singapore - Indonesia - Vietnam - India INTRODUCTION 
 
Singapore’s  leaders  had  candidly  acknowledged  the  country  as  an  artificial  establishment  with  an 
objective and  a finite  life  span, should development stagnate.  Against  this  prognosis, it  has been an 
ongoing  imperative  for  the  city-state  to  formulate  strategies  to  engender  its  continued  growth.  Often 
perceived as an archetypal interventionist state (Castells, 1988; Rodan, 1989; Regnier, 1991; Ng, et al., 
1992;  Huff,  1995;  Yeung,  1998;  Blomqvist,  2001),  Singapore’s  strategy  to  remain  economically 
competitive in the global economy can be interpreted as the building of platforms for national growth 
through the management of strategic alliances and cooperation. In this sense, the selective investments 
are attempts to reallocate key economic resources (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997) via the ‘developmental 
state  model’  (Evans,  1995,  Woo-Cumings,  1999)  whereby  economic  restructuring,  industrial 
transformation and rapid economic growth  are achieved through ‘collaborations’  with private or semi-
private  enterprises  on  national  economic  projects  (Evans,  1995).  Aid  and  incentives  include  liberal 
financial  subsidies  or  co-investments.  State  intervention  is  also  apparent  from  the  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) orientation of the policies, whereby factors of production are adjusted to enhance the 
country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. In short, the country has to be understood as an investor in 
business or society, or both (Pereira, 2001).   
 
In the early 1990s, the Singapore government’s broad strategic intentions were translated into concrete 
policies and programs (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry (SMTI), 1991). Manufacturing 2000, 
International  Business  Hub  2000,  Regionalization  2000  (R2000),  Tourism  2000,  IT  2000  Vision  and 
National  Information  Infrastructure  (NII)  Initiatives,  and  Local  Enterprises  2000  were  all  part  of  the 
blueprint to ensure Singapore’s continued relevance in the global marketplace, amidst the limitations of a 
resource-constrained domestic environment (Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB), 1995a). 
This paper takes up the deliberations on Regionalization 2000 (R2000), a strategic initiative to create an 
external economy, by participating in the dynamic growth opportunities of Asia-Pacific economies (SEDB, 
1993a, 1995b).  The paper’s main focus will be on Singapore’s overseas industrial-township projects.   
 
Further background of the impetus behind the regionalization initiative is first presented to highlight the 
Singapore  government’s  strong  interventionist  style,  extended  to  the  regionalization  policy.  This  is 
followed  by  an  account  of  the  origins  and  progress  of  the  industrial-township  projects  in  Indonesia, 
Vietnam and India. Discussion then shifts towards reflections on the Parks’ contributions to Singapore’s 
regionalization  strategy,  substantiated  by  empirical  findings.  Finally,  implications  garnered  from  these 
experiences,  as  they  relate  to  the  government’s  role  in  Singapore’s  regionalization  program,  will  be 
presented in the concluding section.  
 
SINGAPORE’S REGIONALIZATION GAMBIT 
 
The dearth of natural resources has driven Singapore, a small city-state, to hone its ability to leverage 
global resources for economic growth. Singapore’s long-established stratagem of economic development 
through foreign direct investments (FDI) is well documented (Chia, 1986; Pang, 1987; Yeung, 2001). By 
the early 1980s, rising business costs necessitated a shift from labor-intensive activities towards higher 
value-added ones. Building and strengthening the city-state’s ‘external economy’, through outward direct 
investments, was perceived to be an imperative (Aggarwal, 1985; Pang and Komaran, 1985; Lim and 
Teoh, 1986). Singapore’s economic planners sought to expand the island's investment horizons through 
an overseas direct investment program launched in 1988
1
. This initiative sought to accelerate access to 
new  technology
2
,  or  foreign  markets,  by  supporting  Singapore  companies  to  form  joint  ventures  with 
overseas companies in North America and Western Europe (Caplen and Ng, 1990; Wong and Ng, 1991; 
Murray and Pereira, 1995). Most of these investments proved unsuccessful, resulting in enormous losses 
by  the  early  1990s  (Balakrishnan,  1991;  Kanai,  1993;  Regnier,  1993).  A  new  phase  in  the 
internationalization strategy re-focused on expansion within Asia. The change from internationalization to 
                                                 
1 The main ideas were set out in the policy document, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (SEDB, 1988). The 1990 
Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 1990). 
 
2 For a more analytical approach, see Dunning & Narula (1996), and Dunning, van Hoesel & Narula (1998). regionalization was rationalized by the liberalization of foreign investment controls occurring, at the time, 
in  countries  like  China,  Vietnam  and  Indonesia,  and  the  high  growth  rates  these  economies  were 
achieving (Kwok, 1995; Pang, 1995; Kraar, 1996; Okposin, 1999). Outward direct investments expanded 
strongly, as Singapore-based firms, both local and foreign, increase their investments into the region, to 
take advantage of growing market opportunities in the region. Singapore’s direct investment abroad rose 
from  S$7.5  billion  in  1990  to  S$91.0  billion  in  2000
3
.  In  recent  years,  Singapore’s  outward  FDI  is 
comparable to its inward FDI. About 60 percent of the outward FDI still goes to Asia, but the relative 
share of ASEAN has declined with the increased importance of China (Kaiser, et al., 1996).  As with 
inward FDI, outward FDI have been influenced by government policy initiatives and incentives.  
 
The Singapore government has a dominant role as a stakeholder, a facilitator and a partner to domestic 
enterprises seeking investments abroad (SEDB, 1995a, 1995b; Perry and Yeoh, 2000; Goh et al., 2001; 
Blomqvist, 2002). The role as a facilitator and partner is evident from the creation of familiar Singapore-
havens via industrial parks in neighboring countries and the restructuring of taxation policies
4
. The state 
also  embarks  on  fostering  trusted  regional  networks
5
  identical  to  those  within  its  domestic  market, 
whereby  interlocking  interests,  the  intimate  sharing  of  ideas  and  commonality  of  values,  crystallize  a 
macroscopic  system  of  cooperative  competition  (Dunning,  1997a;  1997b;  Zutshi  and  Gibbons,  1998). 
This is especially relevant for Singapore, which, by reason of its small size, operates through interlocking 
directorships in government-linked companies (GLCs); this has facilitated the implementation of strategic 
initiatives, at a national level, with minimal conflict of interests.  
 
Implicit in the regionalization strategy is the Singapore government’s intention to draw on its effective 
state  enterprise  network
6
  (or,  in  local  parlance,  Singapore  Inc.),  and  extend  this  network  to  facilitate 
business  ventures  in  the  region  (SEDB,  1995a,  1995b).  As  well,  given  analogous  cultures  and 
understanding  through  racial  networks,  and  relatively  strong  governmental  directions,  such  an  extra-
territorial network had the potential for success. Theoretically, the ‘vested interests’ within the interlinked 
collaborative  system  serve  to  expedite  processes,  garner  exclusive  incentives,  and  negate  inept 
bureaucracy. 
 
The  strategy,  itself,  featured  a  genre  of  selective  state  intervention.  Involvement  in  the  township 
development  is  threefold:  firstly,  senior  politicians  are  enlisted  to  negotiate  the  projects’  institutional 
framework (usually pertaining to exclusive investment privileges), and to secure endorsement from host-
country  governments,  to  give  the  projects  political  patronage  and  protection
7
.  Secondly,  ‘government-
selected’ consortia, typically comprising Singapore government agencies and GLCs, take on the role of 
primary investors in infrastructure development. This is premised on the reluctance of private-sector firms 
to  take  on  investments  of  such  scale  and  long  pay-back  period.  As  well,  the  high  risks  involved  in 
venturing into a relatively undeveloped and unfamiliar locale, where political, social and environmental 
conditions are suspect, compounded with uncertainty of investor interest, renders it inherently unattractive 
to  private  enterprises  (SEDB,  1993c).  Thirdly,  the  state  actively  markets  and  promotes  the  flagship 
                                                 
3 Source: Singapore Department of Statistics.  
 
4 By 1993, Singapore had concluded 28 double taxation treaties to encourage companies to use Singapore as a base to enter the 
fast-growing economies of East Asia. An overview of Singapore’s initial incentive schemes to support the regionalization initiative is 
set out in Singapore Investment News, Regionalization Supplement (SEDB, 1993b). 
 
5 The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business practices preferred by the linked communities of ‘overseas Chinese’ 
(Redding, 1990; Yeung, 1997, Brown, 1998; Lehman, 1998), which Singapore made use of in its industrial parks in Indonesia and 
China.  
 
6  The  principles  of  government  involvement  are  rationalized  in  the  Report  of  the  Committee to Promote Enterprise  Overseas 
(Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993). 
 
7 Mechanisms include familiarization tours, formal and informal contacts amongst government officials, the constitution of ad-hoc 
problem-solving committees, and visits by ministerial delegations that emphasize the establishment of interpersonal relationships 
(Kumar and Siddique, 1994). 
 projects to Singapore-based MNCs, on top of the internationalization of Singapore companies. With a 
proven track record, SEDB’s presence adds significant weight, as ‘business architect’ and ‘knowledge 
arbitrageur’, to the promotional efforts (SEDB 1995a, 1995b). 
 
From the strong interventionist style, Singapore appears to have embraced the ‘new trade theory’ which 
suggests that incisive and well-planned government support reaps the potential benefit of enhancing the 
likelihood of domestic companies becoming first-movers in newly emerging countries, even to the extent 
of replacing the original first-movers. The establishment of Singapore’s industrial townships in the region, 
fashioned to create a ‘Singapore-styled’ business environment in emerging economies, illustrates this. 
The  trans-border  industrialization  strategy  envisioned  that,  what  follows,  would  be  the  generation  of 
economic space for Singapore-based companies, both indigenous and foreign, to redistribute resource-
dependent operations to lower-cost production sites and upgrade their Singapore-operations to higher-
end activities which require the city-state’s unique set of competencies.   
 
The following case studies of the industrial parks in Indonesia, Vietnam and India serve to illustrate the 
prevalence of the Singapore government’s role in developing, managing and marketing these gargantuan 
overseas investments. As well, this strategic initiative can also take on an uncharted perspective of being 
an end in itself, that of exporting Singapore’s expertise in industrial infrastructural development across the 
region (Perry, 1995; Tan, 1995; Perry and Yeoh, 2000). 
 
SINGAPORE’S TRANS-BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 
The Indonesian Parks 
The first of Singapore’s overseas industrial parks, Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) and Bintan Industrial 
Estate  (BIE),  are  located  on  the  neighboring  Riau  islands  of  Batam  and  Bintan.  BIP  and  BIE  began 
operations in 1992 and 1994 respectively. The projects were joint ventures between Singapore GLCs and 
Indonesia’s largest  business conglomerate at that time, the Salim Group.  Singapore’s main  industrial 
infrastructure builder, Jurong Town Corporation, and Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now 
SembCorp Industries), led the design, physical development and management of the estate. Salim, with 
its close links to senior Indonesian politicians and privileged access to major investment projects in the 
Riau islands (Perry, 1991; Yeoh et al., 1992, Sato, 1993; Hill, 1996), provided a guarantee of priority with 
respect  to  regulatory  controls  and  government  permissions.  The  division  of  responsibilities  assured 
Singapore of priority placing on regulatory issues in the host environment, and enabled the strategist city-
state to leverage on its reputation for transparency, reliability and efficiency, to foreign investors. 
 
BIP has been successfully developed, with 82 companies employing 65,000 workers anchored in the 
Park. Investment commitment is in excess of US$1 billion, with a strong presence of Japanese firms in 
the  Park.  In  marked  contrast,  BIE’s  performance  remains  modest  with  only  35  tenants  and  13,000 
workers (against the initial projection of 130,000). Only 110 hectares of the 4000-hectare project has 
been developed, at a cost of US$113 million. BIE’s investor profile is largely Singaporean, engaged in 
relatively  low  value-added,  light  industries.  The  project  has  since  been  downsized  to  a  500-hectare 
development. The Parks’ operational statistics are presented in Table 1. New investment commitments in 
BIP have, however, plummeted, and investments in BIE have trickled to a halt in the wake of the October 
2002 Bali bomb blasts. 
 
Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) 
VSIP is Singapore’s flagship investment in Vietnam. The plan was first mooted in March 1994 by the then 
Vietnamese  Prime  Minister,  Vo  Van  Kiet,  and  Singapore’s  Prime  Minister,  Goh  Chok  Tong.  The 
Singapore-styled industrial-park environment was replicated. VSIP offers investors a ‘hassle-free’, self-
contained,  one-stop  service  with  prepared  land  plots  and  ready-built  factories,  Singapore-style 
management expertise and infrastructure support. A 200,000 working population within a 15-km radius 
from VSIP provides a ready pool of low-cost, skilled labor. 
 
The physical design of VSIP is identical to the BIP-prototype. The strategic context, however, differed. 
Singapore’s primary concern with the Indonesian investment had been to promote the restructuring of the 
Singapore  economy,  and  to  exploit  the  complementarity  of  neighboring  economies  (Liew,  1990;  Lee, 1991;  Perry,  1991;  Parsonage,  1992;  Yeoh  et  al.,  1992;  Toh  and  Low,  1993;  Ho,  1994;  Kumar  and 
Siddique, 1994; Reza, 1994; Peachey, et al., 1998; Grundy-Warr, et al., 1999). As well, the Indonesian 
experience was less complex to begin with; endorsements from senior politicians guaranteed a degree of 
administrative certainty, strengthened by the political patronage of the main commercial partner. Vietnam, 
in  contrast,  had  a  more  complex  administrative  and  regulatory  environment,  and  the  projects  had  to 
contend  with  multiple  tiers  of  government  administration,  and  the  competition  (or more  precisely,  the 
‘fiscal politics’) between these tiers at a time of rapid economic and political changes. As well, the VSIP 
project was based on the perception that Singapore agencies have a competitive edge in infrastructure 
development, and had a pseudo-political agenda to showcase the Singapore development model and its 
transferability to other Asian environments (Asian Review, 1996; Yeung, 1998).  
 
In VSIP, Singapore applied lessons learned from its China experience
8
, and made deliberate efforts to 
foster strong collaboration with local authorities. A Management Board
9
 was set up, chaired by the Vice 
Chairman of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee, which pre-empted the perception that VSIP 
was a partnership forced  upon by  the central  government. VSIP is jointly  developed by  a  Singapore 
consortium led by SembCorp Industries
10 and Becamex, a state-owned enterprise.  
 
SEDB’s  role  in  promoting  VSIP  is  evident.  The  difficult  environment  post-1997,  notwithstanding, 
cumulative investment commitments in VSIP exceeded US$400 million within the first 5 years from its 
launch in 1995. Investment commitments in VSIP are currently valued at over US$500 million from 64 
tenants, 53 of  which are  in operation (Table 1).  Most of the tenants are from Singapore, Japan and 
Taiwan, reflecting the importance of Asian multinationals in the Park’s tenant mix, while the sector mix 
ranges from textiles, to electronics and pharmaceuticals. VSIP has a list of ‘priority’ industries, which 
adheres closely to the official list of preferred industries
11
 but given current economic realities, the tenant-
profile suggests that VSIP does not target specific industries. VSIP has yet to post a profit. 
 
International Technology Park Limited (ITPL) 
ITPL,  located  18  km  away  from  Bangalore  in  India’s  Silicon  Valley
12
,  was  launched  in  1994,  as  a 
forerunner for a new generation of Singapore-developed industrial parks in India. The idea was mooted 
by  Singapore’s  Prime  Minister  Goh  Chok  Tong  and  India’s  Premier,  P.V.  Narasimha  Rao,  in  1992. 
Construction  commenced  in  September  1994,  and  the  park  was  officially  inaugurated  in  2000.  The 
partners in the ITPL project are a Singapore consortium of companies
13 led by Ascendas International, 
India’s Tata Group and the Karnataka state government in a 40-40-20 arrangement
14
. 
                                                 
8 There is now an extensive literature on the problems encountered in the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park project (e.g. 
Cartier, 1995; Law, 1996; Perry and Yeoh, 2000); various news reports, for example, The Economist (January 3, 1998), The Straits 
Times (June 30, 1999); and a recently completed (confidential) report commissioned by the Singapore Government. 
 
9 The Board, with representatives from the ministries of Trade, Finance and Interior, as well as the General Customs Department 
oversees the issue of investment licenses, import/export permits, and construction permits.  
 
10 Other members of the consortium include Temasek Holdings, JTC International, UOL Overseas Investments, Salim’s KMP 
Group, LKN Construction, and MC Development Asia. 
 
11 Details are given in Circular No. 8, List of Encouraged, Limited and Prohibited Industries in Export Processing Zones and High-
Technology Industrial Zones, issued on July 29, 1997. 
 
12 Indian universities reportedly graduate about 20,000 to 30,000 software engineers every year, and Bangalore has been a hunting 
ground for Singapore companies and Singapore-based MNCs seeking low-cost IT specialists. 
 
13  The  Singapore  consortium  includes  RSP  Architects,  Planners  and  Engineers,  L&M  Properties,  Sembawang  Industrial, 
Technology Parks (a Jurong Town Corporation subsidiary) and Parameswara Holdings (the investment arm of the Singapore Indian 
Chamber of Commerce). 
 
14 The state government has since reduced its stake to 6 percent, while the Singapore consortium and the Tata Group have 
increased their respective stakes to 47 percent each. ITPL was marketed as an environment that “cuts through the red tape and bottlenecks that are a part of 
India’s infrastructure and operating environment”
15
. The Park’s development consists of 2 phases. Phase 
1, which includes the Discoverer, Creator and Innovator blocks, with built-up office, production and retail 
space,  adopts  the  Singapore-styled,  integrated  ‘work,  live  and  play’  concept.  ITPL’s  futuristic  design 
comes  complete  with  numerous  amenities,  facilities  and  support  services,  and  includes  residential 
apartments  and  penthouses.  More  distinctively,  ITPL  guarantees  uninterrupted  power  supply  and 
telecommunication  facilities,  immediate-occupancy  business  incubator  space,  and  the  formulaic  ‘one-
stop’ service. Phase 2, comprising the Explorer building, an exact replica of the Innovator, Built-To-Suit 
(BTS) facilities, is due for completion in early 2004.   
ITPL’s first development phase is fully committed. The earliest clients included SAP Labs, First Ring and 
24/7. The first 39 tenants started their operations in 1999, and created some 2000 jobs. To-date, there 
are 100 confirmed tenants, of which 93 are operational with 8500 employees (Table 1). The tenant profile 
is fairly balanced, with more than two-thirds of the tenants represented by wholly or partially foreign-
owned firms and more than 70 percent are in software development, integrated circuit design, research 
and  development  and  precision  technology.  ITPL’s  tenants  include  global  players  like  AT&T,  IBM, 
Motorola, Sony, Texas Instruments, Citicorp and Thomas Cook. Operating profits have been registered, 
and ITPL is projected to break even within the next 3 years.     
 
 
SURVEY RESULTS 
 
Prior studies on Singapore’s industrial-township projects have relied primarily on secondary data from 
official publications, press reports, fact sheets, etc. To add empirical rigor to this paper, we conducted on-
site  questionnaire  surveys  and  in-depth  interviews  to  test  the  differential  impact  of  various  factors  in 
influencing  the  decisions  of  companies  to  set  up  their  operations  in  BIP,  VSIP  and  ITPL,  and  the 
differential impact of different types of constraints on their operations in the three sites. The survey design 
and methodology was adapted from Yeoh, et al (2000). The first set of questions sought to determine the 
profile of the respondents: type of ownership, nature of operations and size of establishment; and, the 
second set was structured to gather information on the push/pull factors influencing the respondents’ 
decision to set up their manufacturing operations in the industrial-townships, and the various constraints 
on their site operations. The respondents’ views on the broader environment in the host locations were 
culled from the open-ended questions. SembCorp Industries and Ascendas International provided the 
tenants’ lists and facilitated the on-site interviews. 
 
Profile of the Respondents 
A total of 83 responses were collected. Of these, 27 respondents were located in BIP, 23 in VSIP, and the 
remaining 33, in ITPL. 
Of the 27 respondents in the BIP survey, 7 were wholly Singapore-owned, 5 were Singaporean joint 
ventures, and 15 were wholly foreign-owned. The majority of respondents were mainly involved in the 
manufacture  of  intermediate  products.  7  of  the  respondents  were  involved  in  the  manufacture  of 
consumer products, and another 5 were providers of industrial services. 14 of the BIP tenants employed 
more than 500 workers. There were 7 respondents with sales turnovers of less than US$5 million, 14 
respondents with turnovers between US$5 million and US$50 million, and the remaining had turnovers 
exceeding US$50 million.  
Of the 23 respondents from VSIP, 6 were wholly Singapore-owned, 1 was a joint venture and 16 were 
wholly  foreign-owned.  As  for  the  nature  of  operations,  8  manufactured  consumer  products,  3 
manufactured intermediate products, and 2 were involved in industrial services. None of the companies 
surveyed  were  manufacturers  of  capital  goods.  15  respondents  employed  less  than  100  workers,  5 
                                                 
15 The Straits Times, August 8, 1999. 
 employed between 100 and 500 workers, and the rest employed more than 500 workers. 12 respondents 
had a sales turnover of less than US$5 million, 7 had turnovers between US$5 million and US$50 million, 
while the rest had turnovers larger than US$50 million. 
 
Of the 33 respondents from ITPL, 4 were wholly Singapore-owned, 6 were joint venture and 23 were 
wholly foreign-owned. As for the nature of operations, 16 of the respondents were involved in software 
development, 4 were involved in support services and 2 in research and development. 23 respondents 
employed less than 50 workers, and only 5 employed between 100 and 500 workers. No respondent 
employed more than 500 workers. 15 respondents had a sales turnover less than US$5 million and 4 
respondents had sales between US$5 million and US$50 million.  
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
For push/pull factors, the logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
Pi = exp(Zi)/[ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 
 Where:    Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
                exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
       Zi is a linear function of the push/pull factors
16 defined as  
  
         i = 6 
 Zi = α0 + ∑ αi Fi 
     
i = 1 
Where:   F1 = 1 if ‘Political commitment from the Singapore government’ is selected, 0 otherwise  
        F2 = 1 if ‘Political commitment from the host country government’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
        F3 = 1 if ‘Investment incentives’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
        F4 = 1 if ‘Competitive labor costs’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
        F5 = 1 if ‘Reliable infrastructure facilities’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
        F6 = 1 if ‘Availability of skilled/educated labor’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
        α0 = constant term 
                     αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
The “forced entry” method of regression was used. 
 
Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant (as indicated by the p-values), would 
suggest that the firm choosing that particular push/pull factor is more likely to be from that particular park 
than other similar industrial parks. For example, where BIP is the dependent variable, if the coefficient of 
F1  is  positive  and  significant,  this  would  suggest  that,  after  taking  into  account  the  effects  of  other 
push/pull factors, a firm choosing ‘Political commitment from the Singapore government’ has a higher 
probability of being a firm located in BIP compared to a firm which did not select this choice as one of 
their reasons for re-locating, i.e. political commitment from the Singapore  government is a significant 
                                                 
16 These attributes are indicator (dummy) variables that take the value 1 if they are chosen and value 0 if they are not. 
 pulling factor for the BIP tenants. Tables 2A and 2B present the popular rankings and logit estimations of 
the push/pull factors. 
A similar logit model was applied to the constraints faced by the parks’ tenants: 
Pi = exp(Zi)/[ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 
 Where:    Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
                exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
        Zi is a linear function of the constraints
1 defined as         
i = n 
Zi = β0 + ∑ β i Ci 
   
i = 1 
Where:   Ci (1 to n, depending on the type of constraint) = 1 if constraint i is selected, 0 otherwise  
        β 0 = constant term 
                     β i = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
In this case, estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant, would suggest that the firm 
choosing that particular constraint is more likely to be from that particular park than other similar industrial 
parks. For example, where BIP is the dependent variable, if the coefficient of C1 is positive and significant, 
this would suggest that, after taking into account the effects of other labor constraints, a firm choosing 
‘Shortage  of  semi-skilled  and  skilled  labor’  has  a  higher  probability  of  being  a  firm  located  in  BIP 
compared to a firm which did not select this choice as one of the constraints they face, i.e. shortage of 
semi-skilled and skilled labor is a significant constraint faced by BIP tenants. Tables 3A and 3B present 
the popular rankings and logit estimations of the different constraints. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
Factors Influencing Respondents’ Investment Decisions 
 
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development expertise and the low-cost labor available in the 
host  environments  to  market  its  industrial  parks.  It  supplements  these  purported  advantages  with  its 
political commitment to the Parks, as demonstrated by the many bilateral agreements between the GLCs 
and  host  governments  or  politically-linked  business  conglomerates.  Furthermore,  there  is  a  host  of 
investment incentives that entice multinationals to locate their lower value-added activities in these self-
contained enclaves.  
 
Not unexpectedly, the reliable and efficient Singapore-styled infrastructure was the Parks’ main draw, with 
85%, 70% and 82% of the BIP, VSIP and ITPL tenants surveyed citing it as a pull factor for them to locate 
in the Park respectively. Singapore appears to have succeeded in exporting its ‘expertise’ in infrastructure 
development and creating a location-advantage which is clearly in demand by companies in the South 
East Asian region. 
 
Political commitment from the Singapore and the Indonesian governments is a major concern for BIP 
tenants, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant α1 (=1.727) and α2 (=2.184) for BIP. Since 
Suharto’s demise, shifts in the presidential position have resulted in reshuffling of the cabinet and power 
jockeying  among  the  parties,  ministries,  legislature,  central  bank  and  other  institutions.  Amidst  this 
unstable  political  climate,  both  countries’  political  commitment  to  the  progress  of  the  Park  becomes 
imperative  for  investors  seeking  secure  investments.  In  comparison,  VSIP  firms  value  the  reliable 
Singapore-styled infrastructure over the Singapore government’s commitment to the success of the Park, as indicated by a negative and significant α1 (=-1.602). Furthermore, only 3 respondents cited the latter 
as an affirmative pull factor. This can be attributed to the Vietnamese government’s tight control over the 
economy and nature of FDI, creating an arguably stabler environment. 
 
Another pull factor for BIP is “Competitive labor costs”, with 81% of the tenants indicating so, and as 
indicated by the positive and statistically significant α4 (=2.055). This is expected since BIP serves as a 
low-cost investment enclave, and a large proportion (81%) of the tenants in BIP engage in manufacturing 
activities. Manufacturing being labor intensive inherently requires much low-cost labor. The cheaper cost 
of labor is an added bonus to companies which locate in ITPL, but is not a deciding factor as indicated by 
the negative and highly significant α4(=-3.620) for ITPL. 
 
Major Constraints on the Respondents' Operations 
 
BIP, VSIP and ITPL are now established industrial estate developments, but our study alludes to some 
emerging  constraints  which  have  undermined  the  attractiveness  of  the  Parks.  These  constraints  are 
categorized into three broad groups, namely, those relating to labor, those relating to organization and 
technology,  and  those  relating  to  the  economic  “environment”,  such  as  government  policies  and 
regulations. 
 
Labor constraints 
 
The “cheap” labor resources which drew companies to Indonesia proved to be mere perception rather 
than a reality in BIP, as “rising labor costs” is the main constraint faced by the majority (78%) of the BIP 
tenants  surveyed.  The  logit  coefficient,  at  β  3  (=3.433)  is  also  positive  and  significant.  Low  labor 
productivity exacerbated the difficulties faced by the tenants, which perform predominantly labor-intensive 
activities in  BIP. This is further documented by constant lamentations of industrial relations problems 
during our interviews with the tenants, and which are substantiated statistically by 63% of the BIP tenants 
and the positive and significant β 4 (=4.194) Many VSIP tenants, on the other hand, did not face a problem 
of rising labor costs, as indicated by the negative and significant β3 (=-3.658). Instead, many VSIP tenants 
surveyed (74%) cited shortage of professionals and managers as a labor constraint, further substantiated 
by our logistic regression model where β2 (=2.462) is positive and significant. ITPL tenants, on the other 
hand, do not face such a problem, as indicated by the negative and significant β1 (=-1.538) and β2 (=-
1.618). This could be explained by the fact that the city of Bangalore abounds with excellent schools and 
universities. This coupled with the high standard of education, serves as a continuous source of English-
speaking skilled employment and managerial talent for tenants located in the park. 
 
Organizational/Technological constraints 
 
The Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also proved to be costly, as facilities 
such as the power plant, waste-treatment system and water supply are independently managed. This 
resulted in high overhead costs, especially in BIP where 74% of respondents cited it as a constraint they 
faced, and to some extent less so in ITPL where the corresponding percentage is 48%. The positive and 
highly significant β5 (=2.497) for BIP supports our rankings analysis. Other organizational/technological 
constraints  faced  by  BIP  tenants  (and  less  so  by  ITPL  tenants)  include  difficulty  in  introducing  new 
technology and techniques (β2 = 1.970 for BIP; β2 = -1.454 for ITPL) and the lack of good supporting 
services (β3 = 2.214 for BIP; β3 = -1.289 for ITPL). 
 
Environmental constraints 
 
“Impact  of  host  government  regulations”  and  “competition  from  overseas  industry  competitors”  are 
constraints faced by both BIP and VSIP tenants. However, whereas 89% and 78% of BIP tenants cited 
the above two constraints respectively, only about half of the VSIP tenants and less than a third of ITPL 
tenants indicated likewise. This accounts for the positive and significant β1 (=2.291) and β2 (=2.163) for 
BIP and the negative and significant β1 (=-1.353) and β2 (=-2.137) for ITPL. The government’s control over 
the operating environment and the economic landscape shaped by overseas industry competitors has 
proven more stifling to the operations of the tenants in BIP than to those in VSIP and ITPL. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
In  Asia’s  rapidly  growing  economies,  infrastructure  can  be  unreliable  and  administration  subject  to 
corruption (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996). Foreign investment is invariably drawn to investment enclaves 
that provide privileged access to international trade, principally export processing zones, as well as in and 
around centers of international infrastructure which generally means capital cities. Singapore’s overseas 
parks are configured to exploit these emerging production networks. This context provides opportunity for 
Singapore-developed parks through the provision of superior infrastructure and the ability to negotiate 
investment concessions.  
 
The  special  privileges  secured  by  Singapore’s  flagship  projects  share  a  common  trait:  many  of  the 
privileges  obtained  were  unprecedented,  and  unique,  to  the  Parks.  For  instance,  all  the  Parks  were 
allowed to built and operate their own power and water treatment plants, and telecommunication facilities, 
which in Indonesia and Vietnam, was an exclusive concession granted to the Singapore partners. As a 
result, the Parks enjoy the reputation of reliable infrastructural facilities in areas where these facilities are 
an anomaly. As well, the management boards of the Parks typically include local government officials, an 
arrangement which facilitates the Parks’ privileged access to investment approvals, construction activities, 
import/ export permits and immigration matters. Together, the self-sufficient, self-contained environment 
of  the  Parks  presents  investors  with  a  formulaic  one-stop  service  which  filters  out  administrative 
uncertainties  associated  with  emerging  economies.  Significantly,  Singapore’s  positive  reputation  with 
multinational corporations for its stable, corrupt-free investment environment lends credibility, such that it 
seems  privileged  to  be  located  in  the  Parks.  For  example,  ITPL  is  being  used  by  many  tenants  to 
establish their brand-image, as there is prestige associated with being located in the Singapore-styled 
Park
17
. 
 
Influence can also be exerted through inter-governmental interaction and, where existing, through the 
links to influential ethnic business groups in the investment location who often rely on state patronage for 
their access to infrastructure development projects. The key Singapore partners involved in these projects 
were GLCs (notably SembCorp Industries, Keppel Corp and JTC’s Ascendas), and Temasek Holdings 
(the Singapore government’s main investment holding company). For the Indonesian parks, the main 
local partner was the Salim Group, which, albeit private, is nevertheless well known for its close links to 
senior Indonesian politicians and privileged access to major investment projects. For VSIP, Singapore’s 
GLCs work in partnership with government agencies, national state-owned enterprises and investment 
companies  of  local/municipal  authorities.  The  most  recent  venture,  ITPL  in  India,  also  shares  the 
characteristic of strong government involvement, with the Indian counterparts being the Karnataka state 
government  and  the  Tata  group,  which,  though  private,  is  nonetheless  well  connected  with  local 
authorities. The strategic alliances between Singapore’s own state-owned enterprise networks, and its 
counterparts in the regional sites, were instrumental in mobilizing the financial resources to complete 
these  multi-million  projects  and,  in  most  cases,  within  a  comparatively  short  time-frame  of  18  to  24 
months.  
 
Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, the strategically ‘engineered’, inter-government endorsement of 
the flagship projects, and the enormous resources mobilized through the strategic partnerships, have 
‘failed’  to  shield  the  Parks  from  a  gamut  of  problems,  which  were  highlighted  in  our  empirical  study 
findings. Issues pertaining to the scale and character of development of BIP, viz, its resemblance to a 
Japanese investment enclave and vulnerability to a withdrawal of Japanese investments, as well as the 
limited impact of the Indonesia parks on the transfer of low value operations from Singapore, and the 
associated upgrading of linked activities in Singapore, have been discussed in Peachey et al. (1998), 
Grundy-Warr et al. (1999) and Perry and Yeoh (2000). Peachey et al. (1998) have drawn attention to the 
influx of immigrants to the islands  and, concomitantly, to the social problems of squatter settlements 
which threaten to overwhelm the investment value of the Indonesian parks. The following observations 
update, and offer new insights, on recent developments in the industrial-township projects. 
  
                                                 
17 This was a constant refrain throughout our on-site interviews in ITPL in December 2002. 
 Heightened competition 
Singapore’s  overseas  industrial  parks  are  increasingly  facing  strong  mounting  competition  from 
competing  parks  within  their  vicinity.  Competitor  parks,  some  of  which  are  backed  by  prominent 
Indonesian politicians, have mushroomed around BIP. Panbil Industrial Park, one of the largest of these 
parks,  is  located  opposite  BIP.  VSIP’s  attractiveness  has  been  similarly  eroded  by  competition  from 
newer, albeit smaller, industrial parks developed by experienced and street-savvy developers from Japan, 
Korea  and  Taiwan.  These  competitor  parks’  market  themselves  aggressively  on  price,  charging 
significantly  lower  rentals  for  “no  frills”  land  space.  For  ITPL,  its  success  apparently  hinges  on  the 
“Singapore-styled design and management” reputation, and its capacity to provide stable electricity is the 
only differentiating factor from the other IT parks like the Software Tech Park and Electronics City. There 
is a possibility that the Park’s attractiveness may be eroded, in time, as more IT parks and companies are 
set up in the vicinity to capitalize on the area’s repute, while offering lower rentals with equally reliable 
energy, as the state develops. The economics of heightened competition have called into question the 
premium attached to the ‘superior infrastructure’ in Singapore’s industrial-investment enclaves. 
 
Changes in Political ‘Allegiances’   
For the projects in Indonesia, but less obvious in Vietnam and India, the reliance on personal ties rather 
than  transparent  contracts  has  had  advantages  and  disadvantages.  In  the  Indonesian  projects,  the 
reliance  on  the  Salim  Group  has  been  necessary  in  the  context  of  the  Indonesian  system  of  ‘crony 
capitalism’ fostered by then President Suharto. The end of the Suharto era, and pressure from the IMF 
and  western  governments  for  financial  transparency,  has  diminished  Salim’s political  and  commercial 
influence. Ownership changes at BIP and BIE have brought about uncertainties
18
, as the Parks’ privileged 
access to senior politicians and policy-makers in Jakarta has proved more difficult. Compounding these 
uncertainties, inter-governmental endorsements, post-Suharto, no longer suffice to secure commitments 
at the lower tiers of government
19 . Anecdotal evidence, from our interviews with the BIP tenants, points to 
a more complex regulatory environment for foreign companies, as they have to deal more intensively with 
the provincial and sub-provincial (district) governments. The Parks’ reputation as investment enclaves has 
also not been left unscathed by political developments in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the 
September 11 attacks in the United States, and more recently, the Bali bomb blasts. In addition, negative 
press  reports  on  active  terrorist  cells  within  the  region  serve  little  to  quell  the  innate  risk-aversion  of 
potential investors. Indonesia’s state investment agency recently reported a 35 percent slump in foreign 
investment approvals, from US$ 15.1 billion in 2001 to just US$9.7 billion in 2002
20
. The Parks could do 
without these added sentiments in its larger environment. 
 
In Vietnam, the projects were expected to benefit from the ability of Singapore’s GLCs to obtain a special 
concessions but, in reality, inter-government endorsement (in the spirit of ASEAN economic co-operation) 
has  proved  insufficient  to  secure  similar  commitment  in  the  lower  tiers  of  government.  In  VSIP,  the 
influence  of  local  administrators,  and  their  interests  in  competing  developments,  has  diminished  the 
significance  of  inter-governmental  endorsement  of  the  project.  The  ‘special’  support  from  the  local 
authorities has proved to be less significant than initially thought. Improvements on infrastructural projects 
have  translated  into  a  plethora  of  miscellaneous  fees,  and  added  to  operating  costs.  Our  on-site 
interviews, conducted in August 2002, further point to negative undercurrents over Singapore’s control 
and management of VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, while there is an interest in learning from 
Singapore, tensions have arisen over Singapore-styled management practices, and these have translated 
into  perception  differences,  protracted  conflicts  and  project  delays.  Local  sentiments  towards  the 
                                                 
18 The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has reportedly offered to sell the Salim Group’s stakes in all the Riau projects – 
estimated to be worth S$500 million – in a packaged deal (The Business Times, August 28, 2001). Further restructuring have taken 
place, with the three main stakeholders now being SCI, Ascendas and the Indonesian government. 
 
19 Law No. 22/199 allows provincial, district and municipal governments to write provincial laws, some of which contradict national 
laws, or test the boundaries of their power. The Megawati administration is now proposing a revision of laws on regional autonomy, 
but the direction remains unclear. For a discussion on the problems with regional autonomy and their impact on business, see Van 
Zorge, Heffernan & Associates (April 2002).  
 
20 The Straits Times, January 9, 2003. 
 Singapore partners were not unlike those expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi experience (in China), albeit to a 
lesser degree. It is not inconceivable that the ownership-management structure of VSIP may, in time, be 
restructured to reflect a “better alignment of interests”. 
 
In  India,  varying  degrees  of  commitment  and  support  by  different  state  governments  towards  the 
country’s  development  can  affect  ITPL’s  competitive  advantage.  The  lack  of  good  supporting 
infrastructure  in  the  surrounding  environment,  and  the  disparity  in  local  state-government  supporting 
different cities, serve as a deterrent to investors, even as cities like Hyderabad, Mumbai and Chennai 
continue to advance technologically.  On a broader front, corruption remains endemic, and bureaucratic 
red-tape  is  difficult  to  circumvent.  These  considerations  are,  by  themselves,  deterrence  to  potential 
investors, even with Singapore’s presence and involvement. To hedge Singapore’s strategic interests in 
India,  Ascendas  is  reportedly  collaborating  with  India’s  largest  engineering  and  construction 
conglomerate, Larsen and Toubro, to build Cyber Pearl in the third phase of Hyderabad’s Hitec City, while 
plans are in place to develop another IT park in Chennai. Negotiations to develop similar IT parks in other 
Indian states, on a turnkey basis, have already started. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period of time indicates the ability 
of  the  Singapore’s  state  enterprise  network  to  mobilize  economic  and  political  resources  to  create 
economic  space  for  the  city-state.  Through  the  three  industrial-township  projects,  Singapore  has 
developed an area equivalent to 10 percent of the industrial land area managed by the state’s industrial 
land developer within the city-state.  The projects have obtained special investment conditions within their 
overseas  localities,  and  government  endorsements  which  further  underlines  the  significance  of  the 
projects. On the other hand, Singapore’s overseas parks exist as investment enclaves within a disjointed 
economic and policy environment. 
 
In  Indonesia,  BIP  has  attracted  a  high  level  of  foreign  investment,  fulfilling  the  intended  niche  of 
accommodating high-value projects from investors that are most at risk from administrative uncertainties, 
and  lending  credence  to  Singapore’s  positive  reputation  with  the  multinationals.  BIP  is  now  a  well-
established  project,  but  it  has  not  necessarily  achieved  all  its  development  goals.  It  has  been  a 
springboard for Singapore-Indonesian co-operation  in Riau, but  it  is not  yet clear that  Singapore has 
obtained the resource benefits looked for. BIP may be at risk from the breakdown of the township as a 
separate enclave, and the larger social tensions existing on Batam. The BIE project has been struggling 
to gain investment momentum, arising both from the increased competition for foreign investment and the 
restricted appeal of its operating conditions. Over the longer term, the political uncertainties and policy 
nuances that radiate from Jakarta are unlikely to add to investor confidence. 
 
In Vietnam, Singapore’s investment in  VSIP  takes on an  added  dimension  of rendering  development 
assistance to an ASEAN partner, overtly to foster greater bilateral ties. It is apparent from the mix of 
‘targeted’ industries, and the style of park management and operations, that the intention is for the local 
partners to have a stronger sense of ‘ownership’ of the project. The focus on specific industries that 
complement  Singapore’s  economic  restructuring  is  also  absent,  unlike  in  BIP  or  BIE.  All  the  same, 
underlying vested interests to secure the city-state’s economic interests can be associated with the act of 
camaraderie.  Notwithstanding  the  explicit  or  implicit  objectives,  intense  market  competition,  and  the 
inherent problems of corruption work in tandem to test this strategic initiative.   
 
In India, ITPL can be perceived as a strategic thrust by the Singapore government to capitalize upon first 
mover  advantages  in  a  regional  economy  with  immense  market  potential.  As  the  first  entrant  to 
successfully  develop  and  manage  a  state-of-the-art  technology  park,  ITPL  has  arguably  enhanced 
Singapore’s  reputation  for  infrastructure  efficiency  and  corrupt-free  administration.  More  subtly,  its 
apparent success has leveraged various Singapore companies’ foray  into the Indian IT industry. The 
apparent  success  of  ITPL  should  not  be  overestimated,  as  the  Park’s  infrastructure  efficiency  is 
constrained by the limited support from the local government. The project’s infrastructure efficiency is at 
risk from an environment of disparities in local-state support for competing developments.  
In  summary,  the  Singapore  government’s  role  in  developing,  managing  and  operating  the  overseas 
industrial  parks  has  been  crucial  from  the  start.  However,  initial  assumptions  of  the  advantages 
engendered  by  the  state  enterprise  networks,  as  successfully  proven  through  its  GLC  network 
domestically,  were  overly  optimistic.  Differing  agendas,  sometimes  within  the  same  host  government, 
intertwined with the cultural and political complexities of large economies, and the uncontrolled external 
environment, serve to diminish the efficiency and commercial viability of the Parks. On hindsight, the 
ambition and optimism of developing an ‘exportable version’ of state enterprise networks, and strategic 
alliances  with  regional  governments,  have  been  misplaced.  The  limits  of  state  enterprise  networks, 
beyond demarcated geographical boundaries, have been exposed in the R21 projects. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Operational Statistics of Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
in Indonesia, Vietnam and India 
 
 
 
Source: SembCorp Parks & Ascendas International 
Indonesia  Vietnam 
 
India 
 
General Information 
BIP 
(Jun 2003) 
 
BIE 
(Jun 2003) 
 
VSIP 
(Aug 2002) 
 
ITPL 
(Jan 2003) 
Year of Operation  1991  1992  1997  1999 
Scale of Development (hectares) 
Investment by Developer (US$ million) 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up  
Investment by Tenants (US$ million) 
Export Value (US$ million) 
No. of Employees 
500 
470 
82 
320 hectares 
> 1,000 
> 2,000 
65,000 
110 
113 
35 
110 hectares 
105 
283 
13,000 
1,000 
400 
64 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
7,000 
700 
200 
100 
1.4 million ft
2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
8,500 TABLE 2A 
 
 Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in BIP, VSIP and ITPL 
(By Popular Ranking) 
 
 
Variables  BIP  VSIP  ITPL 
             
  Frequency  Rank  Frequency  Rank  Frequency  Rank 
             
Political commitment from the Singapore government  17  4  3  6  6  4 
             
Political commitment from the host country government  21  3  7  4  6  4 
             
Investment incentives  16  5  12  2  14  2 
             
Competitive labor costs  22  2  11  3  1  6 
             
Reliable infrastructure facilities  23  1  16  1  27  1 
             
Availability of skilled/educated labor  16  5  6  5  12  3 
             
 
Source: Questionnaire survey 
 
 
TABLE 2B 
 
 Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in BIP, VSIP and ITPL 
(by Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit)
ψ ψ ψ ψ, φ φ φ φ 
 
Variables  BIP  VSIP  ITPL 
       
Political commitment from the Singapore government  1.727  -1.602  -0.188 
  (0.034)**  (0.031)**  (0.821) 
Political commitment from the host country government  2.184  -0.706  -1.048 
  (0.005)***  (0.251)  (0.126) 
Investment incentives  0.929  -0.095  -0.398 
  (0.265)  (0.877)  (0.558) 
Competitive labor costs  2.055  0.882  -3.620 
  (0.007)***  (0.147)  (0.001)*** 
Reliable infrastructure facilities  -0.077  -0.309  0.704 
  (0.935)  (0.641)  (0.357) 
Availability of skilled/educated labor  0.865  0.720  -0.091 
  (0.281)  (0.233)  (0.896) 
Constant (α0)  -3.252  2.413  4.178 
  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)*** 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey 
 
 
Note:
 ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression. 
          
φ Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests. 
      *** Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level 
          * Significant at 10% level 
      n.c. Non-convergence 
 TABLE 3A 
 
 Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in BIP, VSIP and ITPL 
(By Popular Ranking)
 
 
 
Variables  BIP  VSIP  ITPL 
             
  Frequency  Rank  Frequency  Rank  Frequency  Rank 
             
Labor constraints             
             
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled labor  11  3  12  2  3  4 
             
Shortage of professionals and managers  10  4  17  1  4  3 
             
Rising labor costs  21  1  1  4  7  1 
             
Industrial relations problems  17  2  0  5  3  4 
             
Others  4  5  4  3  7  1 
             
             
Organizational and Technological constraints             
             
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment  5  4  6  1  3  5 
             
Difficulty in introducing new technology and techniques  11  3  5  2  3  5 
             
Lack of good supporting services  13  2  5  2  4  3 
             
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion  4  5  2  6  2  2 
             
High and/or rising overhead costs  20  1  5  2  16  1 
             
Others  0  6  5  2  4  3 
             
             
Environmental constraints             
             
Impact of host government regulations  24  1  11  1  8  1 
             
Competition from overseas industry competitors  21  2  11  1  4  3 
             
Others  1  3  7  3  6  2 
             
 
Source: Questionnaire survey 
 
 
 TABLE 3B 
 
 Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in BIP, VSIP and ITPL 
(by Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit)
ψ ψ ψ ψ, φ φ φ φ 
 
Variables  BIP  VSIP  ITPL 
Labor constraints       
       
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled labor  2.975  -0.119  -1.538 
  (0.023)**  (0.902)  (0.055)* 
Shortage of professionals and managers  -0.991  2.462  -1.618 
  (0.330)  (0.005)***  (0.021)** 
Rising labor costs  3.433  -3.658  -0.353 
  (0.001)***  (0.003)***  (0.606) 
Industrial relations problems  4.194  n.c.  -1.817 
  (0.001)***  n.c.  (0.022)** 
Others  1.907  -0.673  -0.235 
  (0.168)  (0.485)  (0.753) 
Constant (β 0)  -7.174  n.c.  4.758 
  (0.003)***  n.c.  (0.001)*** 
       
Organizational and Technological constraints       
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment  0.617  0.925  -1.081 
  (0.441)  (0.242)  (0.170) 
Difficulty in introducing new technology and techniques  1.970  -0.293  -1.454 
  (0.011)**  (0.693)  (0.049)** 
Lack of good supporting services  2.214  -0.874  -1.289 
  (0.004)***  (0.247)  (0.057)* 
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion  1.638  -1.013  -0.672 
  (0.088)*  (0.369)  (0.479) 
High and/or rising overhead costs  2.497  -2.466  0.533 
  (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.382) 
Others  n.c.  -0.192  -0.297 
  n.c.  (0.840)  (0.736) 
Constant (β 0)  n.c.  3.272  4.246 
  n.c.  (0.126)  (0.024)** 
       
Environmental constraints       
Impact of host government regulations  2.291  -0.485  -1.353 
  (0.003)***  (0.378)  (0.030)** 
Competition from overseas industry competitors  2.163  0.104  -2.137 
  (0.001)***  (0.848)  (0.001)*** 
Others  -1.856  0.846  -0.360 
  (0.129)  (0.192)  (0.632) 
Constant (β 0)  0.577  0.273  2.989 
  (0.630)  (0.709)  (0.003)*** 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey 
 
Note:
 ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression. 
          
φ Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests. 
     *** Significant at 1% level 
       ** Significant at 5% level 
         * Significant at 10% level 
      n.c. Non-convergence 
 